Congressional Intent and Deference to Agency Interpretations of Regulations by Walker, Melanie E.
Congressional Intent and Deference to
Agency Interpretations of Regulations
Melanie E. Walkert
Increasingly, Congress transfers responsibility for imple-
menting regulatory programs from one administrative agency to
another. The new agency often must interpret regulations prom-
ulgated by its predecessor. Suppose a regulation is ambiguous.
Presumably, the agency that drafted the regulation can better re-
construct its intended meaning. Thus, a court seeking the "cor-
rect" interpretation may defer to the drafting agency. Congress,
however, has delegated the policymaking authority necessary for
implementing the regulatory program to the transferee agency,
and for this reason a court may defer to it.
Current case law suggests two alternative reasons for defer-
ence to agency interpretations of regulations. The Supreme Court
originally held that courts should defer to agency interpretations
for practical reasons: an agency, as author of the regulation, is
more competent than the judiciary to find its intended meaning
and has a better understanding of how different interpretations
can affect outcomes and policy goals. The second reason for defer-
ence to agency interpretations rests on a delegation rationale and
stems from Chevron USA, Inc v Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil.' In Chevron, the Court justified deference to agency interpre-
tations of ambiguous statutes on the grounds that Congress had
delegated to the agency the power to fill in statutory ambiguities.2
Although many courts have invoked Chevron to justify deferring
to agency interpretations of regulations, the Supreme Court has
made no explicit pronouncement that Chevron's delegation ra-
tionale subsumed the Court's prior reasoning in the context of
agency regulations.
In most cases, a court's justification for deference may seem
inconsequential to the outcome.3 Either way, an agency's inter-
t B.A. 1996, Reed College; J.D. Candidate 2000, The University of Chicago.
467 US 837 (1984).
2 Id at 843-44.
' See Paralyzed Veterans of America v DC Arena LP, 117 F3d 579, 584 (DC Cir 1997)
("It would seem that there are few, if any, cases in which the standard applicable under
Chevron would yield a different result than the 'plainly erroneous or inconsistent stan-
dard set forth [for deference to agency interpretations of regulations] in Bowles v. Semi-
nole Rock & Sand Co.").
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pretation, if reasonable, will be adopted by the court. However, as
seen in the example above, and in other cases where two agencies
assert conflicting interpretations of a regulation, the court must
choose between agencies. In these situations, the underlying jus-
tification for deference may change the outcome of the case. In
other words, in cases where agencies espouse different interpre-
tations of the same regulation, a court relying on the Chevron
delegation rationale may defer to a different agency's interpreta-
tion than it would under the previous doctrine.
This Comment argues that just as Chevron revolutionized
deference to agency interpretations of statutes, Chevron should
control courts' deference to agency interpretations of regulations.
That is, a court's deference to an agency interpretation of a regu-
lation should be based on a delegation rationale: when Congress
delegates rulemaking authority to an administrative agency, it
intends the agency's authority to include making reasonable pol-
icy choices in interpreting the regulations promulgated under
that authority. Using the Chevron framework, the Comment con-
cludes that when conflicts arise under the split enforcement
model-that is, where rulemaking and adjudicatory functions
under one statute are split between two independent agencies-
courts should defer to the agency to which Congress has
delegated lawmaking power. If jurisdiction is transferred from
one agency to another, courts should defer to the latter, as the
transfer itself may indicate a congressional determination that
the transferee agency will make policy choices more in line with
congressional intent. When agencies share jurisdiction, it might
be appropriate for the agencies to have different interpretations
given their different spheres of expertise and presumed delegated
policymaking authority within those spheres. A court rarely will
need to determine the controlling interpretation of the regulation
when it relies on a presumption of delegated interpretive
authority.
Part I of this Comment outlines the evolution of the Supreme
Court's justifications for deference to agency interpretations. Part
II argues that the Court's more recent pronouncement that courts
should "presume that the power authoritatively to interpret its
own regulations is a component of the agency's delegated law-
making powers"4 should be uniformly adopted, and then responds
to possible criticisms of this approach. Part III illustrates how a
court's analysis in cases involving interagency disputes should
Martin v Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 499 US 144, 151
(1991).
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proceed given the adoption of the presumption outlined in Part II.
In particular, Part III examines disputes that arise when rule-
making authority and adjudicatory authority are split between
two agencies, when jurisdiction over a statute has been trans-
ferred from one agency to another, and when agencies have
overlapping jurisdiction.
I. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DEFERENCE
A. Pre-Chevron Justifications for Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Statutes and Regulations'
Initially, the Supreme Court accorded a similar level of def-
erence to an agency's interpretations of its own regulations as to
interpretations of its organic statutes.6 The Court reasoned that
an agency's interpretation of the statute it is charged with ad-
ministering deserves respect because "[e]veryday experience in
the administration of the statute gives [the agency] familiarity
with the circumstances."7 Agency interpretations of statutes were
' Some preliminary explanations are in order. Agency interpretations can be either
issued through "interpretive rules" or "legislative rules." The term "interpretive rule" can
be found in the Administrative Procedures Act C'APA"), 5 USC § 553(b)(3)(A) (1994). The
term "legislative rules" does not appear in the APA, but is commonly used among courts
and scholars. See Robert A. Anthony, "Interpretive" Rules, "Legislative" Rules and "Spuri-
ous" Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 Admin L J Am U 1, 2 (1994). Legislative rules are those
that have been promulgated pursuant to statutory lawmaking authority and in accordance
with the procedures set forth in Sections 553, 556, and 557 of the APA. They have the
force of law. Id. Interpretive rules are any rules issued without exercising delegated law-
making authority. They are not subject to the procedural requirements of the APA and are
not binding on courts. See 5 USC § 553 (1994) (exempting interpretive rules from the pro-
cedures set forth in that section) and Kenneth Davis, 2 Administrative Law Treatise 36,
51-52. Interpretive rules are meant to explain how an agency understands the statute, not
add to the substantive law. See Anthony, 8 Admin L J Am U at 13. Agency interpretations
of their own regulations (these regulations themselves being legislative rules) are consid-
ered interpretive rules. Agency interpretations of statutes may be either legislative rules
or interpretive rules, depending on whether the agency is exercising delegated lawmaking
authority. Deciding in any particular case whether an agency is exercising delegated law-
making authority may be difficult, but that issue is beyond the scope of this discussion.
For more on this point, see Stephen G. Breyer, et al, Administrative Law and Regulatory
Policy 247-48 (Aspen 4th ed 1998), and Anthony, 8 Admin L J Am U 1. Unless indicated
otherwise, the agency interpretations of statutes discussed herein were promulgated
through legislative rules.
6 See, for example, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse-
men and Helpers of America v Daniel, 439 US 551, 566 n 20 (1979) ("It is commonplace in
our jurisprudence that an administrative agency's consistent, longstanding interpretation
of the statute under which it operates is entitled to considerable weight.") (citations omit-
ted); United States v Larionoff, 431 US 864, 872 (1977) ("In construing administrative
regulations, 'the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of
controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."),
quoting Bowles v Seminole Rock & Sand Co, 325 US 410, 414 (1945).
NLRB v Hearst Publications, 322 US 111, 130 (1944).
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not controlling-it was still the duty of a court to resolve ques-
tions of statutory interpretation-but were considered persuasive
because of the agency's experience with its organic statutes.8
The Court has found an agency's interpretations of its own
regulations similarly persuasive The Court first adopted this po-
sition in Bowles v Seminole Rock &,Sand Co,"0 where it held that
the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration's interpre-
tation of a maximum price regulation issued under the Emer-
gency Price Control Act was "of controlling weight unless it [was]
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation."" Finding
that the agency's interpretation was reasonable and consistently
applied, the Court enforced the regulation as interpreted by the
agency." The Court gave no explicit justification for granting
such weight to the Administrator's interpretation, but stated that
his interpretations were "tools" for discovering the meaning of the
price regulation. 3 Nothing in the Act itself suggested that Con-
gress intended the Administrator's interpretations to be control-
ling.1
4
Subsequent lower court decisions applying Seminole Rock to
other agency interpretations of regulations gave content to the
deference rationale. One court explained that "[tihe primary ra-
s Id at 130-31 ("Undoubtedly questions of statutory interpretation, especially when
arising in the first instance in judicial proceedings, are for the courts to resolve, giving ap-
propriate weight to the judgment of those whose special duty is to administer the ques-
tioned statute."). See also Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpreta-
tions of Law, 1989 Duke L J 511, 514:
The cases, old and new, that accept administrative interpretations, often refer to the
'expertise' of the agencies in question, their intense familiarity with the history and
purposes of the legislation at issue, their practical knowledge of what will best effec-
tuate those purposes. In other words, they are more likely than courts to reach the
correct result.
Agency interpretations of regulations are set forth in interpretive rules, which are
exempt from the notice and comment requirements of the APA. See 5 USC § 553(b)(3)(A).
See text accompanying notes 79-81 for discussion of possible implications of this exemp-
tion.
10 325 US 410 (1945).
Id at 414.
12 Id at 417-18.
13 Id at 414.
" Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub L No 420, 56 Stat 23, codified at 50 App
USC § 924 (1984), 50 USCA § 902(a), repealed by Pub L No 89-554, § 8(a), 80 Stat 651
(1966). Some statutes do explicitly provide that an agency's interpretation of an act or
regulation issued thereunder is authoritative. See Ford Motor Credit Co v Milhollin, 444
US 555, 567-58 (1980) (finding that a Truth in Lending Act (CTILA") amendment that pro-
vides creditors with a defense from liability based on good-faith compliance with a rule,
regulation, or interpretation of the Federal Reserve Board "signals'an unmistakable con-
gressional decision to treat administrative rulemaking and interpretation under TILA as
authoritative").
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tionale behind the doctrine of deference is recognition of adminis-
trative expertise developed through implementation and en-
forcement of statutes and regulations." 5 An agency's interpreta-
tions of the regulations it had promulgated were considered even
more persuasive than agency interpretations of statutes."6 Be-
cause the agency drafted the regulation, courts presumed that
the agency not only had superior expertise developed through
implementing the regulation, but also greater knowledge of the
regulation's intended meaning. 7
Thus, prior to Chevron, the same reasoning underlay defer-
ence to an agency's interpretations of its own regulations and an
agency's interpretations of its organic statutes. Because agency
administrators have more experience than courts in implement-
ing the statute or regulation and greater familiarity with circum-
stances surrounding the regulatory program, the agency's inter-
pretation is more likely to be "correct."" The agency's interpreta-
tion, therefore, has persuasive force.
Under Seminole Rock, if a court is faced with conflicting
agency interpretations of the same regulation, either the court
could determine the correct interpretation independently-since
neither agency interpretation is controlling-or it could attempt
to determine which agency has superior experience and expertise.
In most, if not all, cases, the drafting agency's presumed superior
" Standard Oil Co v Department of Energy, 596 F2d 1029, 1055-56 (Temp Emer Ct
1978) (holding that the agency should not be-deferred to, because the agency's interpreta-
tion of the regulation was not in effect during the relevant period). Accord Milhollin, 444
US at 566 n 9 (indicating that deference to administrative views is based, at least par-
tially, on respect for agency expertise). Professor Manning argues that the Court did not
supply a rationale for Seminole Rock deference to agency interpretations of regulations
until its decision in Pauley v BethEnergy Mines, Inc, 501 US 680 (1991), at which time it
"incorporated Chevron's more fully developed premises." John F. Manning, Constitutional
Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 Colum L
Rev 612, 619 (1996), citing Pauley, 501 US at 696-97. However, Professor Manning ap-
pears to downplay the Courts previous language mentioning agency expertise in these
cases.
" See Russell L. Weaver and Thomas A. Schweitzer, Deference to Agency Interpreta-
tions of Regulations: A Post-Chevron Assessment, 22 Memphis St U L Rev 411, 418-19
(1992) (observing that prior to Chevron, the Court viewed deference as even more appro-
priate when a court was confronted with an agency's interpretation of its own regulation
rather than an agency's interpretation of a statute), citing Udall v Tallman, 380 US 1, 16
(1965).
" See, for example, Stinson v United States, 508 US 36, 45 (1993) (stating that since
the Sentencing Commission drafts the commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines "we can
presume that the interpretations of the guidelines contained in the commentary represent
the most accurate indications of how the Commission deems that the guidelines should be
applied").
s The idea that a court might choose to defer to agency interpretations of law because
it thinks the agency's interpretation is presumptively correct is raised in Breyer, et al,
Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy at 249 (cited in note 5).
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knowledge of the intent of the regulation would make its inter-
pretation the most persuasive.
B. Deference to Agency Interpretations of Statutes
After Chevron
Chevron is one of the most widely discussed cases in the aca-
demic literature, 9 so the facts of the case will be given limited
exposition here. The important point for this discussion is that in
Chevron the Supreme Court supplied a stronger justification for
deference to an agency's interpretations of its organic statutes. In
short, the Court reasoned that courts should defer because, when
a statute is silent or ambiguous, Congress has delegated the poli-
cymaking authority necessary to fill the gap to the agency
charged with implementing the statute."
The Court developed a two step analysis for cases involving
agency interpretations of statutes. First, the court asks whether
Congress has directly spoken ,on the question at issue. If so, Con-
gress's statement is controlling.2 Second, if there is no clear con-
gressional intent-that is, if the statute is silent or ambiguous on
the question-the court asks whether the agency's interpretation
is "based on a permissible construction of the statute."22 If the
agency's interpretation is reasonable, it is controlling, even if the
court itself would have chosen a different interpretation.23
The Court justified deferring to the agency's interpretation in
this second step by presuming that when Congress fails to spe-
cifically address a given issue in a regulatory scheme,24 it intends
the agency to whom it has delegated policymaking authority to
use that authority to "fill the gap."25 Commentators have ex-
plained that this presumption is based on the Court's rational re-
construction of congressional instructions.26 Because Congress
" A search of the Westlaw database on August 10, 1999 revealed 2,912 secondary
source citations to Chevron.
Chevron, 467 US at 843.
2, Id at 842.
Id at 843.
Id (stating that the court does not impose its own construction of the statute); id at
844 (holding that the agency's interpretation is to be given "controlling weight unless [it
is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute").
2 Id at 865 (noting that Congress may have "desired the Administrator to strike the
balance at this level," may not have considered the issue, or may not have been able "to
forge a coalition on either side of the question").
Id at 843-44.
See Manning, 96 Colum L Rev at 617 (cited in note 15) ("Chevron categorically pre-
sumes that Congress has opted for implementation of the statutory mandate by the more
politically accountable administrative agency, and not the less accountable reviewing
court."); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 Colum L Rev 2071,
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has instructed the agency to make all policy choices within its
sphere of delegated authority, the agency's policy choices are not
merely persuasive to courts, but authoritative.27
The Court went on to set forth several reasons why Congress
delegates this authority to an agency; in other words, why it is
reasonable for courts to presume that Congress intends for agen-
cies to "fill the gaps" it leaves. The Court noted that agencies
have greater political accountability than courts,28 are often in a
better position than the legislature to make difficult political
choices," and have greater expertise than courts and the legisla-
ture in administering often "technical and complex" regulatory
schemes."0 Thus, the notion of superior agency expertise that the
Court originally had used to justify deference to agency interpre-
tations of statutes still played some role in Chevron.1 In many
cases, one of the primary reasons Congress has delegated rule-
making authority to the agency is because of the administrators'
technical expertise and experience. Hence, notions of expertise of-
ten guide the court in determining congressional intent.
The important difference between Chevron and Seminole
Rock is that under Chevron, intent, and not expertise, is ulti-
mately the determinative factor. Under Seminole Rock, the court
defers for practical reasons only. There is no operating presump-
tion that Congress intended the agency to have interpretive
authority. At this point, the distinction between Seminole Rock
deference-to-expertise and Chevron deference-to-legislative-intent
2101 (1990) C'Chevron's principle of deference, then, is an attempted reconstruction of
congressional instructions, one that is responsive to the comparative advantages of the
agency in administering complex statutes."); Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at 516 (cited in note 8)
C'Chevron... replaced this statute-by-statute evaluation ... with an across-the-board
presumption that, in the case of ambiguity, agency discretion is meant."). Compare Thom-
as W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L J 969, 995 (1992) (ar-
guing that there is, at best, weak evidence to support the presumption that when Con-
gress delegates authority to administer a statute to an agency, Congress wants courts to
defer to that agency's interpretation of law).
See Manning, 96 Colum L Rev at 622-23 (cited in note 15) ("When a statute merely
confers authority upon an agency, a reviewing court interprets the statute by determining
the scope of the authority assigned.... If a court refuses to accept (defer to) the agency's
reasonable interpretation of that term ... it usurps the norm-elaboration responsibility
that Congress has committed to the agency's 'Judgment.").
, Chevron, 467 US at 865 ("While agencies are not directly accountable to the people,
the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the gov-
ernment to make such policy choices.").
Id (noting that Congress may have left the question to the agency because it was
"unable to forge a coalition on either side of the question").
Id.
Id (noting that the EPA's decision required expertise in a "technical and complex"
regulatory scheme).
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may seem like a distinction without a difference. Part III shows
how this distinction affects the outcome in some cases.
Chevron itself does not explicitly override Seminole Rock: the
holding in Chevron only reaches an agency's interpretations of its
organic statute. Part II discusses whether the Chevron holding
should reach agency interpretations of their own regulations-
that is, whether agencies are exercising delegated authority when
they interpret regulations they have promulgated. That Part also
argues that the nuanced distinction between Seminole Rock def-
erence and Chevron deference has important constitutional impli-
cations.
In the context of interagency conflict, it follows from Chevron
that if a court is faced with conflicting interpretations of a statute
set forth by two agencies, the interpretation of the agency to
whom Congress has granted rulemaking authority-that is, the
agency with policymaking authority-would be controlling.32
C. Deference to Agency Interpretations of Regulations
After Chevron
The underlying justifications for deference to agency inter-
pretations of regulations and agency interpretations of statutes
were the same before Chevron was decided;3" afterward, however,
it was unclear whether Chevron also applied to an agency's inter-
pretations of its own regulations.'
Several lower courts have cited to Chevron when deferring to
agency interpretations of their own regulations. 5 For example, in
Pope v Shalala,36 the Seventh Circuit, citing Chevron, insisted
' Part LC addresses which agency's interpretation would be controlling when two
agencies set forth conflicting interpretations of a regulation, if a court adopts the justifica-
tion for deference laid out in Chevron.
See Part I.A.
See Weaver and Schweitzer, 22 Memphis St U L Rev at 411-13 (cited in note 16)
(observing that, in light of its "revolution[ary]" effect on deference principles, "it is quite
possible that Chevron affected the Court's approach to agency interpretations of regula-
tions").
' See Foothill Presbyterian Hospital v Shalala, 152 F3d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir 1998) ("If
a statute or regulation is silent or ambiguous, we will defer to the agency's interpreta-
tion."); Paralyzed Veterans of America v DC Arena LP, 117 F3d 579, 585 (DC Cir 1997)
("Under Chevron, an agency's interpretation of ambiguous statutory language is entitled
to deference because of the agency's delegated authority to administer the statute, and the
same consideration underlies deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regula-
tions."); Pope v Shalala, 998 F2d 473, 485-86 (7th Cir 1993) ("When the ambiguous rule
falls within an agency's congressionally delegated authority, it is the chosen policymaker,
and the agency, not the courts, which must select among conflicting interpretations of the
rule .... This deference is especially appropriate when we are faced with an agency's in-
terpretation of its own regulation.").
998 F2d 473 (7th Cir 1993).
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that resolving ambiguities in legal rules-whether they be stat-
utes or regulations-is a component of an agency's delegated poli-
cymaking authority and that courts may not substitute their own
policy judgments for the one made by the administrator."7 The
Ninth Circuit has applied the Chevron two-step analysis to
agency interpretations of regulations, suggesting that the same
reasons underlie deference both to interpretations of statutes and
regulations."
The D.C. Circuit has also maintained that courts should de-
fer to agency interpretations of regulations based on a Chevron
delegation rationale.39 Recently, in Paralyzed Veterans of America
v DC Arena LP,4" the court offered its most thorough explanation
of this position. Paralyzed Veterans concerned the proper inter-
pretation of a regulation issued under the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act stating that wheelchair seating areas in arenas must
have "lines of sight comparable to those for members of the gen-
eral public."41 The Department of Justice interpreted "lines of
sight comparable" to require sightlines over standing spectators.42
The Arena argued that the court should not defer to the DOJ's in-
terpretation because although the DOJ promulgated the regula-
tion, it did not draft it.43 Thus, the DOJ did not have greater
knowledge of the original intent of the regulation than the court."
The court rejected the Arena's argument on the ground that
deference to an agency's interpretations of its own regulations is
not based on the agency's drafting expertise, but on congressional
delegation of authority to reconcile regulatory ambiguities.45 The
court reasoned:
"Id at 485.
Foothill Presbyterian, 152 F3d at 1134 (summarizing Chevron two-step test).
See Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F3d at 585; Amerada Hess Pipeline Corp v FERC, 117
F3d 596, 601 (DC Cir 1997) ("[D]eference is not accorded to agency interpretations [of
regulations] merely because they possess a special expertise. Courts defer to agency inter-
pretations in large part because Congress has chosen to delegate to the agency decision-
making in the field."); Caiola v Carroll, 851 F2d 395, 399 (DC Cir 1988) (citing Chevron for
the proposition that "[i]t is axiomatic that an agency's interpretation of its own regulations
is entitled to considerable deference").
117 F3d 579 (DC Cir 1997).
Id at 581.
4 Id at 582. The DOJ's interpretation was promulgated in a supplement to its Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act Title III Technical Assistance Manual.
' Id at 581 (noting that the regulation was drafted by the Architectural and Transpor-
tation Barriers Compliance Board). The Justice Department has rulemaking authority for
Title Im of the Americans with Disabilities Act. See id at 580, citing 42 USC § 12186(b).
" 117 F3d at 585.
' Id.
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Under Chevron, an agency's interpretation of ambiguous
statutory language is entitled to deference because of the
agency's delegated authority to administer the statute, and
the same consideration underlies deference to an agency's in-
terpretation of its own regulation. The resolution of ambigui-
ties in a regulation implicates the same sort of policy choices
it does with regard to a statute.'
Thus, according to the D.C. Circuit, the same justification un-
derlying Chevron deference supports judicial deference to agency
interpretations of regulations they have promulgated.
The Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed the question
whether the Chevron delegation rationale applies to agency in-
terpretations of their own regulations. Moreover, language on
this point in two recent Court opinions seems to conflict.47 In
Stinson v United States," the Court determined the extent to
which the commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines controls fed-
eral courts' interpretations of the Guidelines, by analogizing it to
agency regulations.49 The Court explained that the commentary is
more analogous to an agency's interpretation of its own regula-
tions than to an agency's construction of a federal statute that it
administers. Therefore, the Court held that the Seminole Rock
standard of "controlling weight," and not Chevron deference, ap-
plied.50
Stinson sheds light on the then-perceived differences be-
tween the rationales underlying deference to agency interpreta-
tions of regulations and agency interpretations of statutes. The
Court reasoned that
[c]ommentary, unlike a legislative rule, is not the product of
delegated authority for rulemaking, which of course must
yield to the clear meaning of a statute. Rather, commentary
explains the guidelines and provides concrete guidance as to
how even unambiguous guidelines are to be applied in prac-
tice.5
Id (citations omitted).
17 See Stinson, 508 US at 36, and Martin v Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission, 499 US 144, 144 (1991), discussed at length below in text accompanying
notes 57-61.
, 508 US 36 (1993). See id at 38 (holding that the commentary in Sentencing Guide-
lines is binding unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute or is inconsistent
with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, a guideline).
Id at 45.
Id at 44-45.
Id at 44 (internal citations omitted).
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The purpose of the commentary is to "assist in the interpretation
and application" of the Guidelines.52 The Court emphasized that
deference was due to the Commission because it "drafts the
guidelines as well as the commentary interpreting them."53
In contrast, had the Court found Chevron controlling, courts
would have been required to yield to the commentary only if a
guideline was ambiguous and then only if it was a "permissible
construction" of the guideline in question.' Much of the commen-
tary addressed unambiguous guidelines.5 Therefore, if the Court
had applied Chevron, much of the commentary would not have
been held binding on federal courts. The important lesson of
Stinson, however, is that the Court did not use Chevron to sup-
plant Seminole Rock; instead, it continued to use the Seminole
Rock justification for deference by appealing to the Commission's
drafting role and expertise.
Arguably, however, the reasoning in Stinson should be lim-
ited to the facts presented since the Court was deciding the legal
force of commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines, not agency in-
terpretations of regulations. The Court's opinion in Martin v Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Review Commission,57 in which it
appeared to adopt the Chevron delegation justification for defer-
ence to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations, is more
directly on point.
In Martin, according to the Secretary of Labor's ("Secretary")
interpretation of a regulation that she had promulgated under
the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("Act"), CF & I Corpora-
tion had violated that regulation.58 When the Occupational Safety
Id at 45.
Id (adding that "we can presume that the interpretations of the guidelines contained
in the commentary represent the most accurate indications of how the Commission deems
that the guidelines should be applied to be consistent with the Guidelines manual as a
whole as well as the authorizing statute").
"The difference in the standard of review courts give agency interpretations of stat-
utes and agency interpretations of regulations is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a
discussion of the varying standards courts have applied, see Weaver and Schweitzer, 22
Memphis St U L Rev at 414, 425-32 (cited in note 16). Weaver and Schweitzer argue that
"in some post-Chevron decisions, the Court has actually used less deferential rhetoric than
it used in pre-Chevron decisions [regarding agency interpretations of regulations]." Id at
428. Interestingly, the Court in Stinson, going on to apply the Seminole Rock standard,
held that the commentary is "binding" on courts and "authoritative," arguably stronger
language than it had used in applying Seminole Rock in the past. Stinson, 508 US at 47.
This may be attributable to changing views on the place of agency interpretations after
Chevron or the unique status of the Sentencing Commission.
"Stinson, 508 US at 44.
"Id at 47.
" 499 US 144 (1991).
Id at 148.
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and Health Review Commission ("Commission") reviewed the ci-
tation given to the corporation, however, it disagreed with the
Secretary's interpretation of the regulation and held that the cor-
poration was not in violation.59 In deciding whether the Secre-
tary's or the Commission's interpretation controls in an enforce-
ment hearing, the Court stated that
[b]ecause applying an agency's regulation to complex or
changing circumstances calls upon the agency's unique ex-
pertise and policymaking prerogatives, we presume that the
power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a
component of the agency's delegated lawmaking powers."
Because Congress granted rulemaking authority to the Secretary,
her interpretation controlled. This is in sharp contrast to the
Stinson Court's focus on drafting expertise and to the statement,
quoted above, that the Sentencing Guidelines commentary is "not
the product of delegated authority for rulemaking."6'
Subsequent Supreme Court cases involving agency interpre-
tations of regulations suggest that the Court has adopted the po-
sition it set forth in Martin62 and has limited Stinson to cases in-
volving the Sentencing Guidelines." Thus, the lower court and
Supreme Court cases reveal a trend toward applying the princi-
ples enunciated in Chevron to agency interpretations of their own
regulations, although the D.C. Circuit is the only court that has
clearly articulated why Chevron should be extended to regula-
tions. Part II attempts to supply the needed justification for the
view that agency interpretations of their own regulations merit
deference because the interpretations are part of the agency's
delegated authority. Part II also demonstrates that the view ex-
pressed by the Court in Martin-that agency interpretations of
regulations merit deference because the interpretations are part
of the agency's delegated authority-is a rational reconstruction
of legislative intent and should guide courts in deciding other in-
9Id At 148-49.
Id at 151. See also discussion of Martin in the context of interagency disputes in
Part HI.A.
,Stinson, 508 US at 44.
See, for example, Shalala v Guernsey Memorial Hospital, 514 US 87, 94-95 (1995)
(holding that the Secretary of Health and Human Services' interpretation of a regulation
was reasonable and entitled to deference, citing Martin); Thomas Jefferson University v
Shalala, 512 US 504, 512 (1994) (holding that the Court "must give substantial deference
to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations," citing Martin and Seminole Rock).
"See United States v LaBonte, 520 US 751, 757 (1997); Neal v United States, 516 US
284, 293 (1996). The Supreme Court has only cited Stinson in one case involving an
agency interpretation of a regulation. See Morse v Republican Party of Virginia, 517 US
186, 201 (1996).
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teragency conflict cases. When deciding which agency interpreta-
tion to defer to, courts should look to which agency Congress has
delegated "interpretive lawmaking power" under the statute in
question."
II. CHEVRON DEFERENCE SHOULD BE APPLIED TO AGENCY
INTERPRETATIONS OF REGULATIONS THEY HAVE PROMULGATED
Part I suggests that there is a growing trend among courts to
apply Chevron to agency interpretations of regulations based on
the notion that an agency's interpretation of its regulations in-
vokes congressionally delegated policymaking authority. This
Part aims to clarify what it means to apply the Chevron justifica-
tion for deference to cases involving the interpretation of an
agency's own regulations. This Part will also substantiate the
controversial view that an agency's power to interpret its own
regulations is a component of the agency's delegated lawmaking
powers and that courts should defer to agency interpretations for
this reason.
A. The Legitimacy of Applying Chevron Deference
to Regulations
1. Intent is a more constitutionally legitimate reason for
deference than relative expertise.
Justice Scalia has argued in support of Chevron that if it is
the constitutional duty of courts to "say what the law is," the
Court must supply a valid theoretical justification for allowing
agency interpretations to be controlling.65 While relative compe-
tence may be a good practical reason for deferring to agencies, it
is not a sufficient constitutional justification for deference. In-
stead, deference can be justified as a means for courts to follow
congressional intent66-delegation of interpretive power to agen-
cies.67
',Martin, 499 US at 151 (discussing interpretive lawmaking power in the context of
interpreting a regulation).
Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at 514 (cited in note 8).
Id at 516.
It is essentially unquestioned today that Congress has broad power to delegate poli-
cymaking authority to agencies. See Touby v United States, 500 US 160, 165 (1991) f'Vfe
have long recognized that the nondelegation doctrine does not prevent Congress from
seeking assistance, within proper limits, from its coordinate Branches. Thus, Congress
does not violate the Constitution merely because it legislates in broad terms, leaving a
certain degree of discretion to executive or judicial actors") (internal citations omitted);
Mistretta v United States, 488 US 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia dissenting) ("[W[e have almost
never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy
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Under Scalia's view, deferring to agency interpretations
solely because of the agency's relative expertise, that is, because
the court thinks the agency is more likely to reach the correct re-
sult, is constitutionally indefensible.68 Because it is the constitu-
tional duty of the courts to say what the law is, courts cannot ab-
dicate this duty because they think the agency is more likely to
get it right.69 As elucidated in Part I," deference under Seminole
Rock is justified on precisely the relative expertise grounds that
Scalia argues are theoretically invalid. In other words, the rea-
soning in Seminole Rock does not provide a constitutional basis
for deferring to agency interpretations of their own regulations.
The justification elucidated by Scalia for Chevron-congressional
intent-represents a more constitutionally legitimate basis for
deference.
2. Indications of congressional intent.
There are strong indications that Congress intends agencies'
p6licymaking authority to extend to the interpretation of their
own regulations. Many of the factors cited in Chevron to support
the presumption that Congress intends agencies rather than
courts to fill the gaps left in statutes-greater political account-
ability, ability to reconcile competing political interests, and ex-
pertise in often complex and technical areas' --apply equally to
agency interpretations of ambiguous regulations. Both tasks in-
volve policymaking and in both- contexts the agency is the con-
gressionally chosen policymaker. However, Chevron involved an
agency exercising rulemaking authority, which is often a large
judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law. As the Court points out,
we have invoked the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation to invalidate a law only twice
in our history, over half a century ago.") (internal citations omitted). Chief Justice
Rehnquist has unsuccessfully tried to revive the nondelegation doctrine. See American
Textile Manufacturers Institute v Donovan, 452 US 490, 543 (1981) (Rehnquist dissenting),
and Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v American Petroleum Institute, 448 US 607,
671, 688 (1980) (Rehnquist concurring in the judgment). This Comment assumes the le-
gitimacy of the current approach to the nondelegation doctrine. But see American Truck-
ing Associations, Inc v United States Environmental Protection Agency, 175 F3d 1027 (DC
Cir 1999) (striking down agency regulation partially on nondelegation grounds).
Chevron itself has been attacked on numerous grounds, principally that it violates
Marbury by giving agencies rather than courts the duty to say what the law is. See, for
example, Merrill, 101 Yale L J 969 (cited in note 26). A defense of Chevron, beyond the
short explanation of Scala's defense of it given above, is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. For other defenses of Chevron, see Sunstein, 90 Colum L Rev 2071 (cited in note
26); Manning, 96 Colum L Rev at 621-27 (cited in note 15).
Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at 514 (cited in note 8).
Id.
7' See Part L.A.
' See text accompanying notes 24-31.
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component of the agency's duties under the statute, and rule-
making is subject to different procedural requirements than
agency interpretations of regulations.72 Therefore, further indica-
tions of congressional intent to delegate interpretive authority
over regulations to agencies are needed.
Agency interpretations of regulations serve a unique function
because they allow the rulemaker to clarify the meaning of the
law without the need for judicial intervention. Section 553 of the
APA provides strong evidence that Congress intends agencies to
have great latitude in interpreting the regulations they have
promulgated. Section 553 provides the "notice and comment" re-
quirements for informal rulemaking, but exempts interpretive
rules from these procedures.73 Agency interpretations of their own
regulations are interpretive rules, since they do not create new
substantive rights or obligations, but rather clarify what rights
and obligations the regulation itself imposes.'4
In discussing the role of interpretive rules, the D.C. Circuit
held that
[t]he reading of the § 553 exemptions that seems most con-
sonant with Congress' purposes in adopting the APA is to
construe them as an attempt to preserve agency flexibility in
dealing with limited situations where substantive rights are
not at stake.... The function of § 553's first exemption, that
for 'interpretive rules,' is to allow agencies to explain am-
biguous terms in legislative enactments without having to
undertake cumbersome proceedings.75
Thus the exemption for interpretive rules serves to encourage
agencies to clarify rules and provide further guidance to those
regulated by the rules.
' See 5 USC § 553 for the procedural requirements of informal rulemaking and 5 USC
§§ 556-57 (1994) for the procedural requirements for formal rulemaking.
5 USC § 553(a)(3) (stating that the subsection does not apply to interpretive rules).
"Interpretations" that do create new rights and obligations must be promulgated as
new rules. See text accompanying notes 85-91. Courts are split on whether Chevron ap-
plies to interpretive rules that are interpretations of statutes. The discussion here suggests
that the better view is that Chevron should apply to interpretive rules across the beard,
although one could also argue that interpretative rules promulgated for regulations are
distinguishable from interpretive rules promulgated for statutes since, with regulations,
the agency is clarifying law it has drafted. Congress may intend courts to be more deferen-
tial to these clarifications, as noted in the discussion that follows.
American Hospital Association v Bowen, 834 F2d 1037, 1045 (DC Cir 1987) (holding
that regulations promulgated by HHS concerning Peer Review Organizations designed to
oversee Medicare expenditures were exempt from notice and comment requirements as
procedural rules or general statements of policy).
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More importantly, interpretations of regulations serve a spe-
cial purpose. As the Court has stated, "Congress itself can elimi-
nate a conflict [in the circuits] concerning a statutory provision by
making a clarifying amendment to the statute, and agencies can
do the same with respect to regulations."76 It is unlikely that
Congress intends courts to override an agency's clarifying inter-
pretive rule on the grounds that the court understood the regula-
tion differently anymore than it intends courts to do the same to
its own clarifying amendments. Thus a presumption that such in-
terpretations are a component of an agency's delegated policy-
making authority is a reasonable reconstruction of congressional
instructions. As Judge Easterbrook has contended, in cases in-
volving an agency's interpretation of its own regulation, it is clear
that Congress has delegated to the agency full power to imple-
ment the regulation.77 In these cases, "judges leave policy-making
to the policy-makers appointed by Congress."7' If Congress ex-
empted interpretive rules from the procedural requirements of
the APA to encourage agencies to promulgate them, it seems im-
plausible that Congress would be in favor of strict judicial over-
sight of those rules.
B. Critiques of the Application and Responses to Them
1. Deference creates incentives to issue vague regulations.
Some commentators have argued against applying Chevron
deference to agency interpretations of regulations because these
interpretations, unlike agency interpretations of statutes, are not
Pope, 998 F2d at 486, citing Braxton v United States, 500 US 344, 347-48 (1991).
Homemakers North Shore, Inc v Bowen, 832 F2d 408, 412 (7th Cir 1987) (treating
interpretation by Secretary of HHS as nonsubstantive and, therefore, exempt from § 553
requirements).
' Id. In Pauley, Justice Scalia, dissenting, argued that when authority for imple-
menting a regulatory scheme has been transferred from one agency to another and the
proper interpretation of a regulation is in dispute, the agency that drafted the regula-
tion-not the transferee agency-deserves deference. Pauley v BethEnergy Mines, Inc, 501
US 680, 707-08 (1991) (Scalia dissenting). The majority disagreed, holding that the trans-
feree agency deserves deference because Congress has transferred all policymaking
authority necessary for implementing the regulatory scheme to the new agency-including
the authority to make policy choices in interpreting regulations. Id at 697 (majority opin-
ion). See also discussion of Pauley in the text accompanying notes 111-16. Both the major-
ity and Scalia agreed that the Coures Chevron jurisprudence controlled-even though the
case concerned the interpretation of a regulation. what they disagreed on was the best re-
construction of congressional intent in delegating interpretive authority. The discussion
here supports the majority's position. It would follow from Justice Scalia's position that
only the Congress that originally passed a bill is in a good position to pass a clarifying
amendment.
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subject to the procedural safeguards of the APA.7 Deference in
this context, the argument goes, creates incentives for agencies to
issue vague regulations to which they later can give substance
through "interpretations,""0 thereby raising rule of law concerns,
that is, concerns that the regulated will not know what rule or
principle to follow.81 The initial regulation will be too vague to
provide a meaningful guide and may be "interpreted" later to ap-
ply to conduct with no previous notice that such conduct would be
considered a violation of the regulation.
The D.C. Circuit explicitly addressed the argument that
Chevron deference will create incentives for agencies to issue
vague regulations in Paralyzed Veterans." The court held that
Section 553 of the APA prevents agencies from promulgating
overly vague regulations:
A substantive regulation must have sufficient content and
definitiveness as to be a meaningful exercise in agency law-
making. It is certainly not open to an agency to promulgate
mush and then give it concrete form only through subse-
quent less formal "interpretations." That technique would
circumvent section 553, the notice and comment procedures
of the APA.3
Agency interpretations of statutes that are not promulgated pursuant to the
agency's rulemaking authority are governed by the less deferential standard set forth in
Skidmore v Swift, 323 US 134, 140 (1944) (holding that interpretive rules are not control-
ling upon the courts, but "do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance" and setting forth the factors
for courts to consider in determining what weight to give the interpretive ruling). Com-
mentators arguing against the application of Chevron to an agency's interpretations of its
own regulations claim that courts should give these interpretations the same degree of
deference accorded to agency interpretations of regulations not promulgated pursuant to
the agency's rulemaking authority-that is, the degree of deference outlined in Skidmore.
In Skidmore, the Supreme Court held that interpretations not promulgated pursuant to
an agency's rulemaking authority are not controlling, but may be considered by a court
because of the agency's "experience and informed judgment." Id at 140.
See Manning, 96 Colum L Rev at 655-57 (cited in note 15) (arguing that Seminole
Rock deference gives agencies "the benefit of any doubt they have created" through vague
regulations); Robert A. Anthony, The Supreme Court and the APA Sometimes They Just
Don't Get It, 10 Admin L JAm U 1, 12 (1996) (arguing that deference to an agency's inter-
pretations of its own regulations "generates incentives to be vague in framing regulations,
with the plan of issuing 'interpretations' to create the intended new law without obser-
vance of notice and comment procedures").
", See Rule of law in Black's Law Dictionary 1332 (West 6th ed 1990) ("The rule of law,
sometimes called 'the supremacy of law', provides that decisions should be made by the
application of known principles or laws without the intervention of discretion in their ap-
plication.").
117 F3d 579 (DC Cir 1997).
Id at 584 (internal citations omitted).
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To phrase this another way, if an agency promulgates an overly
vague regulation, a court could strike down subsequent "interpre-
tations" on the ground that they create new law rather than sim-
ply state what the administrator thinks the law means."
The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Hoctor v United States De-
partment of Agriculture"5 demonstrates how this judicial check
operates pursuant to Section 553-that is, how courts differenti-
ate "interpretations" from "substantive rules" that must be prom-
ulgated according to notice and comment procedures. Pursuant to
its statutory authority and the procedural requirements of the
APA, the Department of Agriculture promulgated a "secure con-
tainment" regulation providing in part that facilities for housing
animals "must be constructed of such material and of such
strength as appropriate for the animals involved.""6 Subse-
quently, the Department issued an interpretation of this regula-
tion requiring that dangerous animals be contained inside a pe-
rimeter fence at least eight feet high. 7
The court held in Hoctor that the eight-foot height require-
ment was not an "interpretation" of any of the terms in the regu-
lation: "There is no way to reason to an eight-foot perimeter-fence
rule as opposed to a... nine-foot fence or a ten-foot fence. None of
these candidates for a rule is uniquely appropriate to, and in that
sense derivable from, the duty of secure containment."" Impor-
tantly, the Department's "interpretation" created new obligations
for animal dealers, because violation of the eight-foot require-
ment was grounds for sanction.8 9 Moreover, since the rule was es-
sentially arbitrary, yet had material consequences for many ani-
mal dealers, those affected by the rule should have had the op-
portunity to suggest alternative heights.0 Given the specific na-
See American Hospital Association, 834 F2d at 1044-45.
82 F3d 165 (7th Cir 1996).
Id at 167-68, citing 9 CFR § 3.125(a).
Hoctor, 82 F3d at 168.
Id at 170.
Id at 169.
"Id at 171. There is also evidence that some Justices, while continuing to be commit-
ted to deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations, will be stricter about
what they consider "interpretations." For example, in Thomas Jefferson University v Sha-
lala, 512 US 504 (1994), Justice Thomas, dissenting, argued that where a regulation
merely expresses a general belief or intent, an agency should not be allowed to "interpret"
substantive rules from it. Id at 519 (Thomas dissenting). The regulation at issue "praise[d]
the benefits of approved educational programs and expresse[d] a belief that communities
'should' pay for such programs" Id. The Secretary interpreted this regulation to impose a
restriction on the reimbursability of the costs of graduate medical education borne by a
hospital's affiliated medical school. Id at 506 (majority opinion). Justice Thomas argued
that by upholding the interpretation, "the Court disserves the very purpose behind the
delegation of lawmaking power to administrative agencies, which is to 'resol[ve].. . ambi-
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ture of the "interpretation" relative to the more vague regulation,
the court ruled that to uphold the "interpretation" would be to
permit circumvention of the notice and comment procedures of
the APA.s1 Thus courts serve an important role in ensuring that
agencies properly comply with the APA. Judicial review furthers
Congress' intent to allow agencies to clarify their regulations
easily while preventing agencies from abusing this authority.
2. Deference to agency interpretations of their own
regulations violates separation of powers principles.
Some commentators also argue that deferring to an agency's
interpretations of its own regulations violates separation of pow-
ers principles by allowing the same entity both to make the law
and to construe it authoritatively.92 A similar argument has been
made that Chevron violates separation of powers by allowing
agencies, rather than the courts, to "say what the law is."93 In re-
sponse to claims that Chevron violates separation of powers,
Judge Starr argues that under Chevron courts still fulfill their
duty to "say what the law is."94 Under Chevron, a court's interpre-
tive task is to determine the boundaries of an agency's rulemak-
guity in a statutory text." Id at 525 (Thomas dissenting) (internal citations omitted). Like
the court in Hoctor, Thomas would have required the agency to issue a separate regulation
under notice and comment.
9 82 F3d at 172.
"See Manning, 96 Colum L Rev at 654 (cited in note 15) (concluding that "Seminole
Rock contradicts the constitutional premise that lawmaking and law-exposition must be
distinct'). See also Anthony, 10 Admin L J Am U at 9-11 (cited in note 80) (arguing that
deference to agency interpretations of regulations violates § 706 of the APA, which re-
quires courts to "determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action").
Anthony does not discuss the underlying justifications for deference to agency interpreta-
tions of regulations; he is more concerned with the fact that in practice the Court has
made these interpretations binding. Id at 4-5. For a response to Anthony's claim that def-
erence violates § 706 of the APA, see Scalia, 1989 Duke L J at 514 (cited in note 8) (noting
that it has never been the case, and was not the case when the APA was adopted, that
agency interpretations are subject to plenary judicial review).
"See Manning, 96 Colum L Rev at 621 (cited in note 15) ("Commentators have fre-
quently observed that Chevron's concept of 'binding deference' is in apparent tension with
the understanding, announced in Marbury v Madison, that '[i]t is emphatically the prov-
ince and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.'"). See also Sunstein, 90
Colum L Rev at 2074 (cited in note 26) (noting that Chevron is "quite jarring" to those who
believe that "it is for judges, and no one else, to 'say what the law is"). Sunstein goes on to
argue that in many ways Chevron is consistent with the New Deal 'reformation" in which
the principles of "administrative autonomy and limited judicial interference with the pro-
cess of regulation" became prominent. Id at 2081, 2119.
Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). See Kenneth W. Starr, Judi-
cial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 Yale J Reg 283, 308-09 (1986).
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ing authority and further determine whether the rule promul-
gated fits within those bounds. 5
The separation of powers argument seems stronger in the
context of agency interpretations of their own regulations since in
these cases not only is the agency exercising purportedly exclu-
sive judicial power to say what the law is, but it is also construing
law that it made." However, even here courts continue to play a
role in interpreting law. Courts check an agency's power to inter-
pret its own regulations by striking down overly vague regula-
tions or purported "interpretations" that are in fact substantive
rules or new law. Furthermore, courts may review regulations to
ensure that, as interpreted, they carry out the terms of the stat-
ute." Finally, courts retain the authority to review the applica-
tion of law to facts. 8 Since courts still play a role in construing
the regulation, the governing statute, and the APA in deciding
whether a given pronouncement is a valid interpretation, it is not
the case that the agency is the law maker and the sole law inter-
preter.
Moreover, recall that when the agency promulgates an inter-
pretation of its own regulation, it is in the same position as Con-
gress when it passes a clarifying amendment. No one would ar-
gue that such congressional action usurps the courts' power to
say what the law is. Because of an agency's expertise, political ac-
countability, and unique relationship to the regulation, Congress
intends for the agency, with limited interference from courts, to
make needed clarifications to regulations and provide guidance to
those regulated. Presuming that the authority to interpret the
Starr, 3 Yale J Reg at 308-09 (cited in note 94) (arguing that Chevron does not vio-
late Marbury because a court retains the authority to decide whether that agency has
been delegated interpretive authority and to determine whether that authority has been
exercised arbitrarily or capriciously). Judge Starr builds off of the argument of Professor
Monaghan. Id at 308, citing Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State,
83 Colum L Rev 1 (1983). Professor Monaghan argued, prior to the Chevron decision, that
deference to agency interpretations of a statute depends on whether substantive law-
making authority has been delegated to the agency. Monaghan, 83 Colum L Rev at 6.
' Professor Manning discusses the difference between deference to agency interpreta-
tions of regulations and deference to agency interpretations of statutes and concludes that
deference under Chevron does not violate separation of powers principles because it "re-
tains one independent check on lawmaking by Congress," whereas when agencies inter-
pret regulations they have promulgated, there is no independent interpretive check on
lawmaking. Manning, 96 Colum L Rev at 639 (cited in note 15).
See Foothill Presbyterian Hospital v Shalala, 152 F3d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir 1998) ("In
reviewing an administrative agency's construction of a statute or regulations, we must
reject constructions that are contrary to clear congressional intent or that frustrate the
policy that Congress sought to implement").
' See Universal Camera Corp v NLRB, 340 US 474 (1951) (holding that agency adju-
dicatory decisions must be reviewed for substantial evidence).
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regulations it promulgates is a component of an agency's dele-
gated policymaking authority is a rational reconstruction of con-
gressional instructions. At the same time, courts retain an impor-
tant role in ensuring that the agency stays within the bounds of
its delegated authority and exercises that authority pursuant to
the correct procedures.
The next Part demonstrates how the adoption of the Chevron
justification for deference to agency interpretations of regulations
is useful in guiding courts when agencies set forth conflicting in-
terpretations of the same regulation.
III. APPLYING CHEVRON DEFERENCE TO INTERAGENCY DISPUTES
OVER REGULATIONS
There are several cases applying deference principles when
one agency is interpreting another agency's regulation or stat-
ute.99 These are the easy cases. Chevron deference only applies to
the statute the agency is charged with implementing. Another
agency may need to interpret the statute from time to time, but
Congress did not delegate policymaking authority under the stat-
ute to the other agency."' 0 Therefore, the second agency's inter-
pretation is not entitled to deference.
The same reasoning holds if we apply Chevron deference to
an agency's interpretation of a regulation promulgated and ad-
ministered by another agency. Congress has delegated policy-
making authority only to the promulgating agency, and that
agency's interpretation should control. In these cases, moreover,
even if the court defers based on the Seminole Rock justification
for deference-agency expertise-it will defer to the agency that
drafted and regularly implements the regulation. In most cases,
this will be the same agency to which Congress has delegated
policymaking authority. Therefore, whether the court adopts the
See, for example, Division of Military and Naval Affairs, State of New York v Fed-
eral Labor Relations Authority, 683 F2d 45 (2d Cir 1982). The FLRA had interpreted the
phrase "official business" in 5 USC § 5702(a) to include collective bargaining done on offi-
cial time and on this basis held that the New York State Council was required to reim-
burse Union representatives for expenses incurred during contract negotiations with the
New York National Guard. Id at 47. After finding that 5 USC § 5702(a) is not part of the
FLRA's organic statute, the court held that "[n]o great deference is due an agency inter-
pretation of another agency's statute." Id at 48. See also Russell L. Weaver, Deference to
Regulatory Interpretations: Inter-Agency Conflicts, 43 Ala L Rev 35, 39-41 (1991) (dis-
cussing cases where one agency has responsibility for establishing a regulatory scheme
and another agency interprets that scheme).
"See General Electric Co v Gilbert, 429 US 125, 141, 144-45 (1976) (holding that
EEOC's interpretation of Title VII was not entitled to great deference because Congress
"did not confer upon the EEOC authority to promulgate rules or regulations pursuant to
that Title").
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Seminole Rock or the Chevron justification for deference, it will
reach the same result.
Other cases are not as easy. This Part discusses these harder
cases. In these cases, whether the court defers to the agency that
it believes has greater expertise for determining the "correct" in-
terpretation-as Seminole Rock suggests-or whether it defers to
the agency to which it presumes Congress has delegated policy-
making authority-as Chevron dictates-often will change the
outcome. Moreover, these cases show that it is sometimes difficult
to determine to which agency Congress intended to delegate poli-
cymaking authority. Each subpart shows how the underlying jus-
tification for deference that a court uses may change the decision
in a case involving interagency conflict. Using the Chevron justi-
fication for deference endorsed in Part II, each subpart also dem-
onstrates how courts should analyze these cases.
Subpart A looks at conflicts arising when rulemaking and
adjudicatory functions for the administration of a single act are
split between two agencies. Subpart B looks at cases in which
rulemaking authority under an act has been transferred from one
agency to another. Finally, Subpart C considers conflicts arising
when two or more agencies share authority to implement an act.
A. Conflicts Within the Split Enforcement Model
Under the "Split Enforcement Model," rulemaking and adju-
dicatory functions for the administration of a single statute are
split between two independent agencies. 11 Thus, for example, the
Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA") gives the Secretary
of Labor the power to set and enforce workplace health and safety
standards and grants the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission ("Commission") the responsibility to "carry out adju-
dicatory functions.""2 Shortly after OSHA was enacted, conflicts
between the proper interpretation of OSHA and regulations
promulgated thereunder arose between the Secretary and the
Commission."3
... For a more detailed description of the Split Enforcement Model and its aims and
problems, see George Robert Johnson, Jr., The Split-Enforcement Modek Some Conclu-
sions from the OHSA and MSHA Experiences, 39 Admin L Rev 315 (1987).
"'Martin, 499 US at 147 (describing the demarcation of responsibilities between Sec-
retary of Labor and Commission). See also Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29
USC § 651 et seq (1994).
" The uncertainty of which agency courts should defer to when the underlying justifi-
cation for deference is not settled is illustrated in the circuit split that Martin addressed.
See Brock v Bechtel Power Corp, 803 F2d 999, 1000 (9th Cir 1986) C([W]e will defer to the
Commission's expertise ... because 'it is the Commission and not the Secretary which is
charged with the final administrative adjudication of the Act.'"), citing Brennan v Occupa-
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In Martin, the Supreme Court held that when the Secretary
and the Commission assert conflicting interpretations of a regu-
lation, the Secretary's interpretation should control. °4 The lan-
guage of the opinion strongly suggests that the Court adopted the
Chevron justification for deference in making its decision. The
Court phrased the question before it as "to which administrative
actor-the Secretary or the Commission--did Congress delegate
this 'interpretive' lawmaking power under the OSH Act."'0 5 A re-
view of the legislative history of the Act revealed that Congress
wanted only one actor to be ultimately responsible for policy deci-
sions made to implement OSHA."° The Court reasoned that if the
power to promulgate rules was divided from the power to inter-
pret them, policymaking authority would be split, contrary to
what Congress intended.0 7 Because the Secretary was delegated
the authority to make policy through rulemaking, it followed that
he alone was delegated the authority to make policy through in-
terpretations."8 Thus, in deciding which agency deserved defer-
ence, the Court looked to which agency Congress intended to
delegate policymaking authority, consistent with the justification
for deference set forth in Chevron."9
Martin was decided consistently with the delegation princi-
ple elaborated in Part II. The rule in Martin, which is controlling
in split-enforcement cases, is that, when agency interpretations of
a regulation conflict, courts must defer to the agency to whom
Congress has delegated policymaking authority. Because rule-
making necessarily involves policymaking, courts may presume
that the agency to whom Congress has delegated rulemaking
tional Safety and Health Review Commission, 513 F2d 713, 715-16 (8th Cir 1975); Dono-
van v A. Amorello & Sons, Inc, 761 F2d 61, 65-66 (1st Cir 1985) (holding that in cases of
conflict the Secretary deserves deference because Congress intended the Secretary, not the
Commission, to have policymaking authority); Bethlehem Steel Corp v Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission, 573 F2d 157, 160 (3d Cir 1978) (holding that when the
Secretary and the Commission offer conflicting interpretations of the same regulation nei-
ther deserves deference).
04 Martin, 499 US at 152.
'MId at 151.
'Id at 153-54.
z Id.
",Id at 154.
"The Court presumed that Congress delegated policymaking authority to the Secre-
tary because the Secretary had greater expertise. Id at 152-53. As noted in Part I, exper-
tise influences to whom Congress initially chooses to delegate policymaking authority. The
court defers not because the agency is more expert than the court, but because the court
presumes that Congress intended the agency to make the necessary policy decision. See
text accompanying notes 28-31. This is a fine distinction that will continue to be relevant
to the analysis in the sections that follow.
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authority is the chosen policymaker, unless the statute or legisla-
tive history clearly indicates otherwise.
However, Martin may have been resolved differently had the
Court followed the Seminole Rock deference model and looked ex-
clusively at relative competence. Under Seminole Rock, the Court
may have determined that the Secretary and the Commission are
equally expert, given their experiences and historical familiarity
with implementing the regulation. In that scenario, the Court
could side with the entity whose interpretation it found to be
more in line with the Court's own view of the most reasonable in-
terpretation.
B. Transferred Jurisdiction
As the federal government attempts to cut down on the size
of the administrative state by dismantling duplicative agencies
and concentrating authority over statutes concerning a similar
subject matter in one agency, it sometimes transfers authority
over a statute from one agency to another.110 These transfers can
give rise to confficting interpretations of the statute and regula-
tions promulgated thereunder by the first agency.
In Pauley v BethEnergy Mines, Inc,"' decided the same year
as Martin, the Court held that when the agency initially respon-
sible for the administration of a statute and the new agency offer
conflicting interpretations of a regulation, courts must defer to
the new agency's interpretation. The case demonstrates how the
justification for deference that a court relies upon can be outcome
determinative in cases where jurisdiction has been transferred
from one agency to another. In Pauley, the authority to adminis-
ter the black lung benefits program was first held by the De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW") and was
later transferred to the Department of Labor ("DOL")." The
authorizing statute provided that the "criteria applied by the Sec-
"'See, for example; 22 USC § 6209(a)(1) (1994) (authorizing the President to transfer
the responsibilities of the Board for International Broadcasting to the United States In-
formation Agency, the Broadcasting Board of Governors, or the International Broadcast
Bureau); Bragdon v Abbott, 118 S Ct 2196, 2203 (1998) (noting transfer, by President, of
responsibility for the implementation and enforcement of Section 504 of the Americans
with Disabilities Act from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to the At-
torney General); EEOC v Delaware Department of Health and Social Services, 595 F Supp
568, 573 (D Del 1984) (upholding transfer of authority to enforce Equal Pay Act from the
Secretary of Labor to the EEOC).
1" 501 US 680 (1991).
"'Id at 683.
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retary of Labor... shall not be more restrictive than the criteria
applicable" under the interim HEW regulations.'
Relying on Martin and Chevron, the majority held that the
Secretary of Labor's interpretation of the HEW regulations, and
his position that the regulations were not more restrictive than
HEW's, were entitled to deference."' The Court stated, "The iden-
tification and classification of medical eligibility criteria neces-
sarily require significant expertise and entail the exercise of
judgment grounded in policy concerns. In those circumstances,
courts appropriately defer to the agency entrusted by Congress to
make such policy determinations."" 5
The Court looked to whether Congress intended the Secre-
tary to have policymaking authority within the regulatory
scheme. Because Congress did not require the DOL to adopt the
HEW interim regulations verbatim, the Court reasoned that
Congress intended the Secretary of Labor to make his own policy
judgments."6 Thus, in determining whether the Secretary's in-
terpretation of the HEW regulations deserved deference, the
Court adopted the Chevron justification for deference.
This rationale was adopted explicitly in Amerada Hess Pipe-
line Corp v Federal Energy Regulatory Commission."7 The regula-
tions at issue in Amerada were promulgated by the Interstate
Commerce Commission. Subsequently, authority over oil pipe-
lines was transferred to FERC."8 The court held that FERC's in-
terpretations of the regulations promulgated by ICC were enti-
tled to deference because "deference is not accorded to agency in-
terpretations merely because they possess a special expertise.
Courts defer to agency interpretations in large part because Con-
gress has chosen to delegate to the agency decisionmaking in the
field.""9
Had the Court in Pauley relied on the Seminole Rock justifi-
cation for deference, it might not have deferred to the Secretary's
interpretation. Rather, it likely would have determined inde-
pendently whether the Secretary's new regulations were more re-
"'Id at 695, citing 30 USC § 902(f)(2) (1994).
'. 501 US at 698 ("As delegated by Congress, then, the Secretary's authority to prom-
ulgate interim regulations 'not ... more restrictive than' the HEW interim regulations
necessarily entails the authority to interpret HEW's regulations and the discretion to
promulgate interim regulations based on a reasonable interpretation thereof. From this
congressional delegation derives the Secretary's entitlement to judicial deference.").
"'Id at 697.
,,GId.
11'117 F3d 596 (DC Cir 1997).
...Id at 600.
"'Id at 601.
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strictive than the HEW regulations. The drafter, HEW, had the
requisite institutional memory of the meaning and intent of its
regulations and also had experience implementing them, when it
still had administrative responsibility. Since HEW was disman-
tled and its interpretation, consequently, was unavailable, the
Court would have had to construe the regulations itself. Alterna-
tively, the Court might have reasoned under the Seminole Rock
model that the transferee agency is still more expert than the
Court, and therefore deference to the transferee agency is appro-
priate. Such reasoning would raise a host of issues about the kind
of expertise the transferee agency must possess to merit defer-
ence. Must an agency have promulgated a regulation to be an
"expert" on the "correct" interpretation? Would the agency have
sufficient expertise if implementing authority had only recently
been transferred to it? A rule that when Congress transfers poli-
cymaking authority from one agency to another it intends for the
new agency's policymaking authority to extend to the interpreta-
tion of regulations promulgated by the prior agency is more pre-
dictable and pragmatic. The new agency assumes all of the poli-
cymaking authority for the regulatory scheme. Moreover, the
transferee agency should not be limited to prior interpretations
inconsistent with its own policy judgments.
C. Conflicts Arising out of Overlapping Jurisdiction
There are a number of substantive areas in which Congress.
has delegated regulatory power to more than one agency. For ex-
ample, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of
Justice share responsibility for enforcing the antitrust laws; the
National Labor Relations Board and the Secretary of Labor share
responsibility for labor policy; and the Federal Drug Administra-
tion and the Department of Agriculture have overlapping juris-
diction over some labeling policies.12 These overlaps create the
possibility of conflicting interpretations of the same statute or
regulation. Moreover, they present the most difficulties for courts
attempting to decide which agency interpretations, if any, should
be given deference.
The D.C. Circuit was the first court to confront a conflict of
overlapping jurisdiction. In Caiola v Carroll,2' the appellants
were debarred as government contractors under a regulation is-
sued jointly by the Department of Defense, the General Services
"' See Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U
Chi L Rev 1, 28 (1995).
851 F2d 395 (DC Cir 1988).
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Administration, and the National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration.122 The appellants argued, among other things, that
Carroll, an agent of the Department of Defense, erroneously in-
terpreted the phrase "reason to know" in the regulation.'23 Rely-
ing on Chevron, the D.C. Circuit held that while an agency's in-
terpretations of its own regulations usually are entitled to "con-
siderable deference," such deference is inappropriate when the
regulation was written and promulgated by three separate agen-
cies.'24 "The diffusion of the interpretive authority among several
agencies, and the possibility of inconsistent interpretations,
weaken the case for deference."' 25
In holding that deference was inappropriate, the Caiola court
implicitly sought to reconstruct congressional intent as to
whether the courts should defer to any agency when several
agencies jointly promulgate and enforce a given regulation. The
court determined that prudential concerns counseled against def-
erence. The court feared that the agencies would interpret the
regulations differently, leaving government contractors uncertain
as to how to comply with the regulation. 126 Moreover, the court
may have felt it lacked guidance in deciding which agency de-
served deference. The decision costs associated with this inquiry
may have been too high compared to independently interpreting
the regulation. Given these considerations, the court reasoned
that Congress likely intended that the court be vested with inter-
pretive authority. 12
Had the Caiola court relied on the expertise principle of
Seminole Rock instead of the delegation principle of Chevron, it is
unclear that the case would have come out differently. However,
the analysis would have been quite distinct. The court could have
found that because the Department of Defense had not drafted
the regulation alone, it had no special insight into the regula-
tion's intended meaning and effect.'28 In any particular case,
however, deference would depend on the court's knowledge of the
process by which the regulation was adopted. If the agency advo-
cating the interpretation was responsible for the research and
policy analysis underlying the regulation, or the agency had more
experience with the subject matter, the agency's interpretation
' Id at 397.
'.Id at 399.
'"Id.
'Id.
' Id.
127 Id.
'See Bethlehem Steel, 573 F2d at 160. See also note 103 and accompanying text.
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could be entitled to greater deference. Under Seminole Rock, a
court might let the interpretation bind the other agencies apply-
ing the regulation, countering the possibility of inconsistent in-
terpretations.
The complexity of cases such as Caiola, in which overlapping
jurisdiction must be resolved, suggests that the presumption ar-
ticulated in Part II may need more refinement. While Chevron
counsels courts to determine to which agency Congress has dele-
gated policymaking authority, courts must remember that Chev-
ron is only a presumption based on a rational reconstruction of
congressional intent. In some circumstances, as the court found
in Caiola, congressional intent may cut against deference.
In overlapping jurisdiction cases, there are two possible op-
tions: courts may adopt an across the board presumption that in
cases of potentially inconsistent interpretations due to joint im-
plementing authority,"9 courts should not defer to any agency's
interpretation of the regulation. 3 ' Alternatively, courts may
make a case-by-case determination whether in any particular
case it is possible to defer to one agency's interpretation without
risking inconsistent interpretations. Which path courts take may
depend on individual judges' position in the debate over the rela-
tive merits of rules versus standards.
Consider Bowen v American Hospital Association,131 involving
one agency's interpretation of a statute under which many agen-
cies had rulemaking authority. In a case such as this, a reason-
able reconstruction of legislative instructions might point towards
deference even if multiple agencies share policymaking authority.
The portion of the Rehabilitation Act at issue in American Hospi-
tal Association authorized any head of an Executive Branch
agency to promulgate regulations prohibiting discrimination
'"Note that courts may want to guard against not only directly conflicting interpreta-
tions, but also interpretations that are slightly different and as such pose practical com-
pliance problems. To take a simplified example, and one involving the implementation of a
statute rather than a regulation, suppose one agency promulgates a regulation under Sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the Act at issue in Bowen v American Hospital
Association, discussed in the text accompanying notes 131-33) requiring two and one-half
foot wide passageways to accommodate wheelchairs on airplanes and another agency
promulgates a regulation requiring four-foot wide passageways to accommodate wheel-
chairs in national parks. These regulations do not directly conflict and both are within the
agencies' statutory authority. However, it might be preferable to have standard width re-
quirements so wheelchairs could be a standard size.
"'See Weaver, 43 Ala L Rev at 67 (cited in note 99) (observing that Chevron and Mar-
tin provide insufficient guidance in cases of overlapping jurisdiction and that, therefore,
courts should independently construe the meaning of the statute or regulation at issue).
,3, 476 US 610 (1986).
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against the handicapped. 12 The Court held that no agency's in-
terpretation of the Act deserved deference because "there is [ ] not
the same basis for deference predicated on expertise as we found
[in Chevron]."33 The Court reasoned that because Congress had
not delegated exclusive policymaking authority under the Act to
any one agency, there was no basis on which to presume that
Congress wanted the Department of Health and Human Services'
interpretation, in this case, to be controlling.
One could argue, however, that Congress intended for each
agency to use its expertise, political accountability, and ability to
respond to competing interests in its area of concern to make ap-
propriate regulations, and, accordingly, had delegated to each
agency precisely the authority to construe the (very general)
statute within the agency's jurisdiction. Under this view, the
Court should have deferred to HHS since its regulation concerned
treatment of handicapped infants in hospitals, and, thus, FHS
was acting within its sphere of delegated authority. 1" If each
agency is to act only within its area of concern and expertise, it is
reasonable to infer a congressional delegation of interpretive
authority to each agency." 5
A rule that in such cases no deference is due any agency
would decrease courts' decision costs and force Congress to legis-
late with this background rule in mind. If Congress wants an
agency's policy choices to control, it can explicitly instruct the
courts to defer. However, a case-by-case determination likely
would lead to deference in many instances. As the example above
illustrates, Congress sometimes sets a broad policy goal and then
asks various agencies to help implement that goal in their dis-
crete areas of regulatory control. Interpreting a regulation prom-
ulgated under such an act calls upon the same expertise, political
'1id at 642.
' Id at 642 n 30.
' Even using this analysis, the Court would have found the Secretary's regulation an
unreasonable regulation: "Even according the greatest respect to the Secretary's action,
however, deference cannot fill the lack of an evidentiary foundation on which the Final
Rules must rest." Id at 643.
'"See, for example, KMart Corp v Cartier, Inc, 486 US 281, 293 n 4 (1988) (suggesting
that it may be appropriate for agency legislative rules to be based on varying interpreta-
tions of the same statutory phrase when the phrase is being applied in different contexts).
Here again the subtle difference between deference to expertise and deference to legisla-
tive intent inferred (in part) from expertise arises. A court might find an implied congres-
sional intent to delegate interpretive authority because of the agency's expertise in and
familiarity with the area of health care. Because a court would be trying to find the best
reconstruction of legislative intent, it could hold, as the court in Caiola held, that Con-
gress intends the courts not to defer where interpretive authority is diffuse. Congressional
intent would trump expertise.
1999] 1369
The University of Chicago Law Review
accountability, and ability to reconcile competing political inter-
ests that moved the Court to adopt the Chevron presumption of
congressional intent to delegate.136 The case-by-case approach,
therefore, seems to account better for how Congress at times
delegates authority and furthers the presumption that Congress
prefers agencies rather than courts to make necessary policy
choices.
The discussion in this Part demonstrates that when conflicts
arise within split enforcement schemes and when jurisdiction has
been transferred, applying the Chevron justification for deference
to agency interpretations of regulations is consistent with the
Court's approach-as illustrated in Martin and Pauley. Thus, ex-
tending the Chevron justification for deference to interpretations
of regulations not only is more theoretically defensible, as shown
in Part II, but is supported by the Court's recent jurisprudence.
This Part also shows why the subtle difference between Seminole
Rock deference to expertise and Chevron deference to congres-
sional delegation matters. Had the Court followed the reasoning
in Seminole Rock in these cases, they may have come out differ-
ently, and predictability would have been sacrificed.
Cases of overlapping jurisdiction are more difficult to resolve
using the Chevron model. In attempting to reconstruct congres-
sional intent, courts are faced with competing concerns. On one
side there are concerns with agencies promulgating conflicting in-
terpretations. Moreover, determining whether Congress intended
courts to defer to one agency over another may be an inefficient
use of judicial resources. On the other side is the acknowledg-
ment that Congress delegated implementing authority to these
agencies and is relying on their policy choices for sound reasons.
The advantage of Chevron in this context is that it focuses a
court's attention on the right question: What is the best recon-
struction of congressional intent in these circumstances?137
CONCLUSION
In Chevron, the Court adopted a new, more constitutionally
legitimate justification for deference to an agency's interpreta-
tions of its organic statutes: because resolution of statutory ambi-
guities often involves policy determinations, courts should pre-
"See text accompanying notes 28-30.
"Professor Sunstein phrases the issue in similar terms. See Sunstein, 90 Colum L
Rev at 2086 (cited in note 26) ("[Ihe court's task is to make the best reconstruction that it
can of congressional instructions. And if Congress has not made a clear decision one way
or the other, the choice among the alternatives will call for an assessment of which strat-
egy is the most sensible one to attribute to Congress under the circumstances.").
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sume that Congress has intended that the agency, and not the
courts, make this policy choice. The Chevron justification for def-
erence should replace Seminole Rock, the Court's prior justifica-
tion for deference to agency interpretations of regulations, which
was based solely on an assessment of relative institutional com-
petence.
The Chevron justification for deference will lead courts to
better results in cases in which there are interagency conflicts in
interpreting agency promulgated regulations. Courts should focus
their attention on determining to which agency Congress in-
tended to delegate policymaking authority. In split-enforcement
and transferred jurisdiction cases, this analysis is both consistent
with precedent and premised on a more constitutionally justifi-
able theory than Seminole Rock deference. Moreover, in the
harder cases of overlapping jurisdiction, applying the Chevron ra-
tionale will focus courts' attention on reconstructing implicit con-
gressional instructions, thereby leading to more straightforward
discussions of when and why courts should defer.
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